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Abstract 
We analyse incentives for cooperative behaviour when heterogeneous providers are faced 
with regulated prices under yardstick competition. Providers are heterogeneous in the degree 
to which their interests correspond to those of the regulator, with close correspondence 
labelled altruism. Deviation of interests may arise as a result of de-nationalisation or when 
private providers enter predominantly public markets. 
We assess how provider strategies and incentives to collude relate to provider characteristics 
under yardstick competition regulation. 
Our results suggest that under the yardstick competition each provider’s choice of 
cooperative cost is decreasing in the degree of the other provider’s altruism, so a self-
interested provider will operate at a lower cost than an altruistic provider. The prospect of 
defection serves to moderate the chosen level of operating cost. More general results show 
that collusion is more stable in homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets; in markets 
served by purely altruistic providers there is no collusion on costs while in markets served by 
purely self-interested providers there is scope for collusion. Our analysis demonstrates that it 
is important to consider the composition of the market when designing yardstick competition 
arrangements.   
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1. Introduction 
Many countries have introduced some form of yardstick competition in order to regulate 
prices in contexts where providers face limited competitive pressure. Examples are the 
maximum price limits each water company may charge its customers in the UK (Ofwat, 
1993); price caps imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to hold down the 
wholesale price of natural gas and electricity in interstate commerce in the US (US 
Department of Energy, 2002); postal tariffs determined by independent regulators in 
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (NERA, 2004); and prospective 
payment system (PPS) that have been introduced to pay for health care services in many 
countries (Schreyögg et al., 2006; Ma, 1994). 
The fundamental idea behind yardstick competition is that the price (or price cap) faced by 
each provider is dependent on the actions of all the other providers (Schleifer, 1985; Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993). According to Schleifer’s rule, the price each provider faces is based on the 
costs of all other providers in the industry but not its own. This creates strong incentives for 
cost control: each provider’s cost reducing effort will not be detrimental to the price it faces. 
A potential drawback with yardstick competition is that providers have an incentive to 
collude on higher costs, first because they can get a higher price for their services and, 
second, because they can exert less cost reducing effort, thereby benefiting from slack 
(Wilson, 1989) .  
In contexts where there is a large number of providers, this is unlikely to be problematic, 
mainly because the cost of collusion rises (Pope, 1989). But there is greater potential for 
cooperative behaviour in contexts where there is a limited number of providers. This is likely 
for utilities, rail or postal services. But it can also arise in health care, for instance because 
specialist services (like bone marrow or lung transplantation) are concentrated among a 
handful of providers or in places such as Northern Ireland or Iceland, which have considered 
introducing PPS arrangements despite there being fewer than five hospitals in each country. 
The incentive to collude with other providers will depend on the objectives of the provider, 
particularly the extent to which their objectives correspond with those of the price-setting 
regulator. We use the terms “altruistic” to describe providers that have objectives closely 
related to those of the regulator and “self-interested” to describe providers whose interests are 
more divergent from those of the regulator (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Bozeman, 1984; Rainey 
et al. 1976). If providers differ in their degree of altruism, they may behave quite differently 
in response to financial incentives (Aas, 1995). Divergence among providers may arise in 
situations where greater plurality of provision is being encouraged. For example, traditionally 
public (National Health Service) systems such as England, France, Portugal and Italy are 
encouraging more private sector organisations to enter the health care market (Oliveira and 
Pinto, 2002; Aballea et al 2006; Levaggi, 2007;  Pollock and Godden 2008). Similarly many 
countries have de-nationalised many services, either wholly or in part. Public providers may 
have a strong sense of mission, aiming to maximize the well-being of the people they serve 
(Wilson 1989), just as the regulator would like. But private providers are also accountable to 
their shareholders, with an interest in profit making. This implies that they have a weaker 
sense of “public” service mission, and might have objectives that are less closely aligned to 
those of the regulator (Newhouse, 1970; Hansmann, 1980; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). 
There are a number of works that have addressed the issue of collusion under yardstick 
competition (Boardman et al 1986; Tangeras, 2002; Chong and Huet, 2005). Our paper is 
particularly close to Potters et. al. (2004). The authors present an adapted version of 
Schleifer's model (Schleifer, 1985) and test it experimentally in order to explore collusion 
incentives under different yardstick competition schemes. However the existing literature 
assumes homogeneous providers. The aim of the paper is to analyse incentives for 
cooperative behaviour when heterogeneous providers are faced with regulated prices under 
yardstick competition. We analyse the choice of cost when providers do not co-operate and 
when they collude, and we consider incentives to defect from the collusion agreement. 
More general results show that collusion is more stable in homogeneous than in 
heterogeneous markets, in markets served by purely altruistic providers there is no collusion 
on costs while in markets served by purely self-interested providers there is scope for 
collusion. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of 
the model, and considers cooperative behaviour under a yardstick competition model. Section 
3 presents summarizes the main results of the paper and section 4 draws the main 
conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. The Model 
Consider a market with three types of agent: consumers, providers and a regulatory authority. 
We consider two providers i  (with 2,1i ) each with its own population of consumers 
defined geographically, so that each provider is a local monopolist facing a downward-
sloping demand curve with  
ip   being the price paid by consumers for each unit of service q .  
In sectors that provide services of public interest, such as for postal services, utilities, or the 
healthcare sector consumers may face the full or a partially subsidised price. Under yardstick 
competition, the regulator establishes a payment that gives the providers incentives to reduce 
costs. In particular each provider faces a regulated price set beforehand equal to the average 
(say) of the marginal costs of all the other providers in the market except its own (Shleifer, 
1985). We assume that costs are observed by the regulator. 
The regulator sets a cap - p

 - on the price that each provider can charge. Note that this 
restriction will bind in equilibrium otherwise there would be no need for regulation. 
The main objectives of a regulation policy are to promote technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency by simulating the outcomes of competitive markets (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
When providers enjoy a degree of monopoly power, they can provide a lower volume of 
output than they would in a competitive situation and, thereby, secure higher prices. This 
causes welfare loss. Moreover, monopoly firms lack incentives to be cost efficient, thus 
undermining technical efficiency. 
The utility of provider i - iU - is a function of the regulated price , the marginal costs  
and the altruism level . We assume that altruistic and self-interested providers are 
distinguished by the degree to which they are concerned about consumer surplus,  
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       (1) 
This is graphically represented by the area under the demand curve for their services, above 
their price.  Recall that consumer surplus is decreasing in the unit price of the service, so that 
the greater the degree of altruism, the greater the utility providers derive from lower prices. 
We further assume that the provider cares about consumer welfare to some proportion i  
with 2,1i . Without loss of generality we assume that provider 2 is at least as altruistic as 
provider 1, i.e.       . We further assume that providers benefit from slack, i.e. they derive 
utility from avoiding cost reducing effort (Bradford and Craycraft, 1996; Pope, 1989). The 
ipˆ ic
i
benefit of slack  (  ) is an increasing function of cost at a decreasing rate (i.e.  
 (  )  
     (  )   ). Thus the utility of each provider is given by the sum of net revenues, the 
benefit from slack, and the utility the provider derives from increased consumer welfare, 
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Assumption 1: For iii  ,2,1  we have: (i)    
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Assumption (i) insures that    is well behaved and therefore that the second order conditions 
for a maximum are met (it also ensures that the trace of the Jacobian matrix is negative); (ii) 
states that the own price effects on marginal utility are of greater magnitude than cross-price 
effects; (i) and (ii) ensure that the Jacobian determinant is positive that is a sufficient 
condition for the equilibrium to be stable. 
 
 2.1The first best and free price scenario 
For comparison purposes we first develop a first best benchmark. Consider a first best 
scenario by which the regulator can decide on both the price and the cost of each service. In 
each local market the optimum is then characterized by the pair {  
    
 } that maximizes social 
utilitarian welfare ( ) given by the sum of consumer surplus and the provider's utility5, i.e.: 
       (     )  (    ) ∫  ( ) ( )  (     ) (  )   (  )
 
  
                     (3) 
with       . 
Maximizing welfare with respect to price and cost, the social optimum
6
 is then given by the 
first order conditions (FOC henceforth) with respect to the price, 
(     ) 
 (  )     (  )                        (4) 
and with respect to the cost, 
 
                                                          
5
 Note that consumer surplus shows twice in this utilitarian welfare function because some providers are 
altruistic. We have assumed a utilitarian welfare function as it is commonly used in the literature. Other 
functional forms would have an impact on our results but that is out of the scope of our analysis.  
6 Social optimum solved in Appendix A1 
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According to (4) the optimal price should be such that the marginal net revenues due to an 
increase in the price equal the change in consumer surplus weighed by the altruistic 
parameter i . Correspondingly (5) entails that the provider's marginal benefit from slack 
should be equal to the effect of increased costs on revenues. From (4), the socially optimal 
price rule can be written as: 
     
  
  
  
|  |
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With    being the price elasticity.  
For        we have a negative mark-up i.e.    
    
 while for      the mark-up is 
zero, i.e.   
    
 . For the existence of an interior solution the condition       
  (   )
   (   )
   
must hold (ensures a negative definite Hessian). 
 
Note that the optimal price differs with the level of altruism, so if       the price for the 
less altruistic provider is at least the same as the price for the more altruistic provider, i.e.   
  
    
 , while by (5) the first best cost of the more altruistic provider is lower than the cost 
of the least altruistic provider, i.e.    
    
  (see Appendix A1). 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis it is useful to evaluate a free price scenario. The 
following proposition summarizes the results. 
 Proposition 1:  In a free price scenario the price and cost of the more altruistic provider 
are lower than those of the most altruistic provider. Furthermore providers’ prices and costs 
are higher than in the first best. 
 Proof: Proof in Appendix A2. 
According to Proposition 1, in the absence of regulation the provider would optimally price 
higher than the socially optimal price. Therefore, any price cap regulation will bind in 
equilibrium. 
  
 2.2 The provider's problem 
 
Non-cooperative solution 
We will analyse two types of games. First we start by describing a setting in which providers 
strategically choose the cost level in a one shot game. In section 2.3 we characterize a 
repeated game. 
In a one-shot non-cooperative game, each provider    maximises its utility by choosing the 
cost   given the price rule to which the regulator will commit. Provider i 's problem is given 
by, 
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Since we are considering a two-agent model, the yardstick rule is such that provider    faces a 
price per service that is equal to the competitor’s (  ) marginal cost in providing the same 
service, i.e.   ̂     . 
 
The FOC with respect to cost        , is given by: 
          0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
.'ˆˆ1
ˆ ' 

















i
i
iii
i
i
iii
i
i
i
i
c
p
pqcS
c
p
qcppq
c
p
c
U
                     (7) 
 
Proposition 2: Under a non-cooperative the equilibrium is such that providers optimally 
choose the same level of costs, i.e.   
     
      , the cost does not change with the 
altruism level. For            ,    
    
    
     
     
    
 , while   
    
    
   
  
     
    
 . 
Proof: Proof in Appendix A3. 
Corollary 1: When providers are purely altruistic i.e.         then  
         
         . When providers are purely self-interested i.e.         , then  
     
             . 
Proof: Proof in Appendix A3. 
 
The scenario under which providers are purely self-interested (       ) is akin to 
Scheiffer’s (1985) original model  and the first best price coincides with the yardstick price 
the regulator has committed to. It follows that under such regulated price while a provider’s 
cost reduction leads to a reduced price faced by the other provider, it does not adversely 
affect its own price. This arrangement gives both providers strong incentives to operate at a 
socially optimal cost level. Take the more altruistic provider (   ), which affords greater 
weight to consumer surplus. The price this provider faces depends on the costs of the other 
c i
provider, implying that the consumer surplus has less influence on its own choice of costs. 
The opposite rationale holds for the more self-interested provider. These results hold 
independently of the degree of altruism. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that 
0//  i
nc
ii
nc
i ddcddc   (see Appendix A3).  
However, for any other levels of altruism the regulated price is no longer set according to the 
first best price rule (indeed in the first best   
    
             ). Consequently as the 
yardstick price is a weaker regulatory instrument when compared to   
  it follows that 
providers costs levels will be higher than in the first best, i.e.   
     
     
    
 .  
 
 
Cooperative solution 
Still on a one shot game, we will now characterize the cooperative solution within which 
providers maximize their joint utility   ∑    . The advantage of agreeing on a strategy is 
that the providers can avoid “competing” against each other in lowering their production 
costs. Collusion allows providers to limit their cost reducing effort while receiving a higher 
price for their services. Offsetting these benefits, there are the negative effects resulting from 
lower demand as well as reduced consumer surplus (which affects utility in proportion i ). 
Thus, the final outcome will depend on the balance of these effects. Letting the superscript c  
indicate the cooperative solution, the following proposition summarises the results in a 
cooperative scenario. 
 
Proposition 3: In a cooperative scenario, for       and    [   ]  for   {   } the 
providers’ cost strategies are such that  
    
       [   ]                 . With 
asymmetric levels of altruism   
    
        
  for      . Providers cost strategies 
decrease on both levels of altruism (i.e. 0/ ii ddc  , 0/ ii ddc  ). 
Proof:  Proof in Appendix A4. 
 
Corollary 2: In the case of homogeneous purely altruistic providers, i.e.         cost 
strategies are such that   
    
        
 . In the case of homogeneous purely self-
interested providers, i.e.         it follows   
    
        
 . 
Proof:  Proof in Appendix A4. 
 
Note that, in a cooperative scenario, providers maximize joint surplus and therefore provider 
i’s decision rule displays provider -i’s altruism level. It follows that the providers’ 
optimization problem is symmetric apart from the differences between providers’ altruistic 
levels namely  and . This implies that the costs of one provider decrease in 
relation to the level of altruism displayed by the other. 
 
As in the non-cooperative solution, the more altruistic provider cannot influence the 
consumer surplus it produces as this depends solely on the cost chosen by the other, less 
altruistic, provider. It can impact, though, on the other provider’s consumer surplus even if 
this weighs less in the optimal decision rule.  The situation under this yardstick regime is akin 
to the two providers swapping their roles. Indeed, even though provider 2 is more altruistic 
than provider 1, a situation of pure collusion is such that provider 1 exhibits the strongest cost 
response in order to reflect the impact of costs on consumer surplus.  In this way provider 2 
can afford a higher cost. This higher cost will allow provider 1 a higher yardstick price that 
will counterbalance the decreased benefit from slackness caused by a lower cost. 
 
For a given cic , we note that the cooperative and the non-cooperative best responses of 
provider i, are given respectively by:   
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These expressions differ in the quantity )()1()(')( iiiii cqcqcc    . The term 
)()1( ii cq  is the net effect that provider i's cost directly has on provider -i's revenues.  The 
term )(')( iii cqcc 
 
is the effect of a unit of provider i's cost on the joint surplus as 
determined through the demand function. We note that, with regard to provider 1, the impact 
is positive because 
cc cc 21  . Thus we can conclude that, for a given 2c , the cooperative 
strategy of the more self-interested provider 1 is that it will operate at a higher cost than in the 
non-cooperative scenario. It can be shown (see Appendix A4) that this result holds also for 
the more altruistic provider 2.  
 
)( 12 cq )( 21 cq
If the market is served by two purely altruistic providers, the costs will be the same as in the 
non-cooperative scenario. 
 
To summarise the results, given that the consumer surplus depends on the regulated price and 
given that the regulatory scheme sets , the maximization of the joint utilities (  ) is 
such that provider i's choice will affect provider -i's consumer surplus. It follows that provider 
i makes a decision on costs bearing in mind the altruism level of the other provider.  
 
 
Defection solution 
This cooperative solution can never be sustainable in a one shot game. Indeed, consider 
provider i. If this provider defects from the cooperative agreement (considering that provider 
-i plays according to the cooperative strategy), then it will revert to behaving according to the 
best response function as in (9) with the optimal defection cost dic  (where the superscript d  
indicates defection) satisfying: 
  (   
 )    (  
 )                    (10)
             
Proposition 4: Provider i’s defection cost lies between the optimal non-cooperative and the 
cooperative strategies i.e.   
        
    
 . Furthermore   
    
  for       and the 
defection costing strategies are decreasing with both providers altruism level, i.e. 
   
 
   
  , 
   
 
    
   for   {   }    {   }     . 
Proof:  Proof in Appendix A5. 
 
Intuitively provider i’s best response is   
    
 , given the choice of the other, and it would 
still face a higher price and therefore increase its surplus. The provider’s decision is based on 
the maximization of its own utility and the FOC will coincide with the non-cooperative FOC. 
However the defection level will differ from the non-cooperative level as provider –i is still 
playing the cooperative solution.  
 
Given the latter, since   ( )    the negative impact of the yardstick price on providers’ 
profit through the cost of providing the service (i.e.   (   
 ))  is higher in absolute value for 
provider 2 (since in the cooperative scenario the demand for this provider is higher than for 
ii cp ˆ
provider 1) moreover since    ( )    the cost of reducing the slack is lower for provider 2. 
Therefore these imply that for provider  2 it pays off more to decrease its marginal cost of 
providing the service (even if that implies a reduction in the benefit from slack) than for 
provider 1 and therefore the deviation strategies in equilibrium are such that   
    
 . 
 
Given that the cooperative costing strategies decrease with the altruism level, then it follows 
that the cost of providing the service for each provider also increases with the altruism due to 
an increase in the demand (i.e.   (   
 ) is bigger in absolute value for higher levels of 
altruism). Therefore both providers will need to deviate further from the cooperative 
agreement in order to compensate for this impact of increased altruism on the cost of 
providing the service. 
 
To sum up we have shown that in a one shot game deviation from the cooperative agreement 
is always profitable and, consequently, collusion is never sustainable. Therefore the one shot 
Nash equilibrium is non-cooperative. This result is consistent with the findings of the existent 
literature (Tirole, 1988). 
 
 2.3 Repeated game: Incentives to collude 
Let us consider a repeated game in which the providers can play grim trigger strategies 
(Friedman, 1971). At the beginning of each period the two providers choose the cost level 
and act according to the following trigger strategies. If one of them defects in some period t, 
by choosing a cost level   
    
 , then in any subsequent period the other provider reverts to 
play her best response to defection from that point onwards. This is a typical "trigger 
strategy", whereby if a provider deviates from the cooperative agreement all providers revert 
to the one shot Nash equilibrium from thereon. Therefore, in deciding whether to stick to the 
cooperative agreement, a provider compares the stream of profits of cooperating   
  (    )  
with the stream of profits obtained by deviating i.e.   
      
   (    ) . It is easy to show 
that collusion is sustainable for provider   if and only if    (  
    
 ) (  
    
  )⁄  where 
  
   is the equilibrium payoff provider   receives in the non-cooperative scenario,   
  is the 
payoff gained in collusion and   
  is the payoff obtained in defection. The outcome depends 
on the individual discount rate    [   ], that represents the extent to which each provider 
considers short term profits more valuable than profits accrued later in time. The higher the 
rate the lower is each provider’s incentive to collude. Therefore it follows that collusion is 
sustainable for       
      {      }  
With,  
   
  
    
 
  
    
             
   
     
 
   
     
   
 
 
When the market is served by two purely altruistic providers, i.e.      it is easy to see that 
providers have no incentive to collude since   
    
  . In fact providers do not have an 
incentive to deviate from the non-cooperative cost under joint profit maximization.  
 
[Figure 1 in here] 
 
If providers are homogeneous and self-interested, it follows that since         and   
decreases with the altruism level. Collusion in such a market is more likely than in a market 
served by two purely altruistic providers. 
 
In heterogeneous markets collusion stability will depend on   .  Sustainability of collusion in 
the presence of asymmetric providers depends on the shape of the demand and slack 
functions.  In particular for the more altruistic provider (provider 2) cooperation is profitable 
only if the benefit from slack is big enough to offset the financial loss and the decrease in 
consumer surplus that more altruistic firms have to bear in cooperation, i.e.   
     
  holds 
if and only if: 
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                              (11) 
 
If this condition is not verified, if provider 2 were to collude he would sustain a loss with 
respect to the non-cooperative strategy in every single period, i.e.      implying that there 
would be no collusion (see Figure 2). 
[Figure 2 in here] 
 
In order to infer how     changes according to the level of altruism we performed a 
comparative static analysis to study how provider i's rate changes with their own and the 
competitors degree of altruism.  Proposition 5 summarizes the results. 
 Proposition 5: A provider’s incentive to collude is a decreasing function of its own level of 
altruism and an increasing function of its competitor’s altruism. 
Proof: Proof in Appendix A7. 
 
Departing from a homogeneous sector in which providers have the same level of altruism, 
increasing one provider’s level of altruism decreases its incentive to collude in the market, 
while increasing its competitor level of altruism increases the incentive to collude.  Thus in a 
heterogeneous market, the altruistic provider’s incentive to collude7 is lower than it would be 
in a market where providers have the same level of altruism. Intuitively it might be that 
homogeneous providers find it easier and more profitable to collude because of their 
symmetric objectives. 
 
With regards to the more self-interested provider 1, similarly it can be shown that, as provider 
2’s degree of altruism increases, provider 1’s rate decreases. Thus in a heterogeneous market, 
the self-interested provider’s incentive to collude is higher than it would be in a market where 
providers have the same level of altruism.  
 
Comparing    across providers it is easy to show that       for       (see Appendix A7) 
therefore as long as (11) is verified there is scope for collusion in heterogeneous markets and 
collusion is less (more) likely when the altruism of the more (less) altruistic provider 
increases (decreases). 
 
Corollary 3: For a given level of   , since       collusion is more likely to be sustained in 
homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets. 
Proof:  Proof in Appendix A7. 
 
This result is in line with the existing literature that has shown that asymmetries between 
providers are an obstacle to collusion (see for e.g. Scherer, 1970; Barla, 2000; Compte and 
Ray, 2002). Given that in many contexts policy has been to encourage the entry of private 
providers in traditionally public settings these results suggest that increasing the plurality in 
                                                          
7
 Note that here we are merely referring to the individual incentive to stick with the cooperative agreement 
rather than the sustainability of collusion as that will depend on the actions of both providers considered 
simultaneously. That analysis follows in the paper. 
 
service provision renders collusion less likely to occur. 
Finally, when comparing pure altruistic homogeneous markets with pure self-interested 
markets, we notice collusion on costs higher than the non-cooperative costs is more likely in 
the latter. 
 
3. Conclusion 
A potential drawback with yardstick competition regulation is that it might be susceptible to 
collusion, because by colluding on higher costs, providers may be able to secure a higher 
price for their services. We find that the incentive will depend on the degree to which 
provider objectives correspond to those of the regulator under yardstick competition 
arrangements. 
We generalize the literature analysis by allowing for provider heterogeneity in their degree of 
altruism. By relaxing the assumption of provider homogeneity we are able to explore a 
fundamental change in the provision of public services where greater plurality is being 
encouraged. For example, traditionally public health systems such as England, France, 
Portugal and Italy are encouraging more private sector organisations to enter the health care 
market. Similarly many countries have de-nationalised many other public services, either 
wholly or in part. The important qualitatively different results obtained by our framework 
indicate that market structure should be considered when designing yardstick competition 
arrangements. 
Our analysis demonstrates that it is important to consider the composition of the market when 
designing yardstick competition arrangements. We show that in markets served by purely 
altruistic providers there is no collusion on costs while in markets served by purely self-
interested providers there is scope for collusion. We show that collusion is more stable in 
homogeneous than in heterogeneous markets, i.e. departing from a scenario where providers 
are homogeneous, we find that a change in the altruism of one provider decreases the stability 
of collusion in a repeated game. To sum-up, the incentives to collude depend on the extent to 
which providers share similar objectives. With pluralistic markets being encouraged in many 
countries and sectors of the economy it is increasingly important that provider heterogeneity 
is taken into account when designing regulatory policies. 
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A  Appendix 
 
A1 First Best Solution 
The solution to the following optimization program, 
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So that *p  and  *c   denote the optimal level of price and cost that solve the system of 
equations defined by (A1.1) and (A1.2).  
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In the case of a linear demand function we have 
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Rearranging (A2.2): 
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Moreover given that the mark-up decreases with the altruism level it follows that   
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 A3 Non-Cooperative Scenario: The Provider’s problem  
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 
Given the utility function being maximized (A2.1), the FOCs with respect to cost    are 
given by, 
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Given assumption 1,  for   iiii  ,2,1,  we have: (i)    
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From (A.3.2) we see that price do not depend on altruism and the price is given under 
regulated price. Therefore the condition for profit maximization (A3.2) becomes: 
  (  )   (   ) 
We argue that the optimal solution (  
      
  ) is the symmetric solution to (A3.2), i.e.  
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To prove that there is no asymmetric solution we will look for profitable deviations from the 
asymmetric equilibrium. Consider the asymmetric solution   
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Suppose that firm   decreases its cost by     . From (3) we can see that firm   by varying    
in      gains  (  
  )     at the cost of    (  )    . By the SOCs we know that   
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  ) therefore it is always profitable for firm   to decrease its cost. 
Now suppose that firm   increases its cost by     . From (3) we can see that firm   by 
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Suppose that firm   deviates by decreasing its cost by    . From (3) we can see that firm   by 
varying    in      gains  (  
  )     at the cost of    (  )    . Now for   
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given the SOCs we know that   (  )   (  
  ) therefore it is never profitable to deviate by 
decreasing the cost. 
 
Now suppose that firm   increases its cost by      . From (3) we can see that by varying    in  
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  ) therefore it is always profitable to deviate by increasing 
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Comparing costs and prices across the different scenarios.  
First note that in the non-comparative scenario    does not vary with the altruism level 
(neither the price given the price rule  ̂      ) while prices and costs in the first best and 
free price scenarios (i.e.   
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 ) are all decreasing in the level of altruism (see proof 
above).  
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 Comparing the non-cooperative with the free price scenario. We know that for          
{   }, from (A2.2) it follows that   
    
 
. Therefore given that the cost FOC in the non-
cooperative scenario (A3.2) is equal to the cost FOC in free price scenario (A2.3) it follows 
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Finally for            we know that: 
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Therefore given a)-h) it follows that the costs of the different scenarios are ranked in the 
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Comparative statics and equilibrium payoffs 
Recall from (A3.2) that the optimal costs must satisfy the FOCs: 
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c
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c
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c
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







 
In matrix format: 






















0
0
12
11
2212
2111


c
c
cFcF
cFcF
 
Using Cramer’s rule we obtain: 
J
Ac
J
Ac 2
1
21
1
1 ; 






 
 
Where: 
i
i
i
i
FcF
FcF
A
cFF
cFF
A
cFcF
cFcF
J













212
111
2
222
211
1
2212
2111
;  
Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J: 
 
 
 
 
0
0''
0'
0
0'
0''
2
222
112
1
221
111






i
nc
nc
i
nc
nc
F
cScF
cqcF
F
cqcF
cScF


 
With J>0 the sign of  
ii cc   21 , will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2. 
 
     
      0
0
1212112
2122211


cFFFcFA
cFFcFFA
ii
ii


 
Therefore it follows that: 
                                                        
021  i
nc
i
nc cc 
                          (A3.3) 
 
 
Utility payoffs 
The utility payoff of provider i as a result of its maximization behaviour is given by, 
.)()(
)()()()(









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i
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i
c
i
nc
i
c
i
nc
i
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i
nc
i
nc
i
nc
i
dxxqcS
dxxqcScqccU


                        (A3.4) 
When   ii , 
in equilibrium by symmetry   
      
       and FOC (A3.2) becomes, 
0)(')( 


cScq
c
U
                                         
(A3.5)
 
Therefore, for both ownership types in equilibrium providers gain the same utility payoff  
.)()( 


ncc
ncnc dxxqcSU 
                                                
(A3.6) 
 
  
A4 Cooperative Scenario 
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
In a cooperative scenario providers optimally choose ic  by maximizing their joint profits  
JU: 
  











2
1 ˆ
)()()ˆ(ˆmax
i p
iiiii
c
i
i
dxxqcSpqcpJU   
 
Thus for ii cp ˆ , 
 
  












 i c
iiiii
cc
i
ii
dxxqcScqccJU )()()(max
,

                            (A4.1) 
 
The FOCs are given by, 
2,10)()1()(')()(')( 


 icqcqcccScq
c
JU
iiiiiii
i

               
(A4.2) 
               
 
These conditions can be rewritten as: 
 
(A4.3a) 
 
And  
 
(A4.3b) 
 
 
Suppose that 
cc cc 12  . Given 0)('' icS  and  21 
    ).(')(1)(')(1 112221
cccc cScqcScq    
 
Therefore,
  0)(')(')()()()(')()()(')()( 12212111222211  cccccccccccccc cqcqcccqcqcqcccqcqcccq
 
However for 0(.)' q and 0(.)'' q  this inequality never holds for 
cc cc 12  . Now suppose that 
cc cc 12  . Then rewriting and subtracting (A4.3a) and (A4.3b) we obtain: 
0))(( 12 
ccq  
 
For 0(.) q  and 21    this can only hold for 21   . Therefore for 21    it must be 
that 
cc cc 12  . For 21   by symmetry
cc cc 12   . 
 
Comparative Statics 
  )(')()( )(')(1 2211221
2
cccccc cqcccqcScq
c
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

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c
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
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Proceeding with comparative statics let:
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Total differentiation leads to: 
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In matrix format: 






















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c
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Using Cramer’s rule we obtain: 
J
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J
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

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

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Where: 
1212
1111
2
2212
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1
2212
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;










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

FcF
FcF
A
cFF
cFF
A
cFcF
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Therefore computing the partial derivatives in A1, A2 and J: 
           
   
   
           
  0
0'''1'''
''
0
''
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





cqF
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F
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


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  [        2122 '1''' cqcqcS   ]  [        1211 '1''' cqcqcS  ]  [    21 '' cqcq  ]
 
>0 
 
 
Under the  assumption 1   (   )     (  )  and linear demand function J>0 so the sign of 
1211 ,   cc will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2. 
 
     
      0
0
121112112
211222111


cFFFcFA
cFFcFFA


 
 
For a linear demand function  A2<0  and A1<0. It follows that:  
 
                                                             0,0 1211  
cc cc                                   (A4.4a)  
 
Analogously for   : 
                                                            0,0 2221  
cc cc                                   (A4.4b)  
  
Proof or Corollary 2 
 
In order to show
nccc ccc  12 , consider (A3.8b) for i=1 and rewrite it as 
 
   0)(1)(')()(')( 1212112
1


 cccccc cqcqcccScq
c
JU
  
 
Comparing with the non-cooperative FOC the latter has an extra term: 
  )(1)(')( 12121
cccc cqcqcc  . As in equilibrium cc cc 12   it follows that 
  0)(1)(')( 12121 
cccc cqcqcc  . Consequently *1 ccc
ncc  . As 
cc cc 12
 1,0*2  i
ncc ccc  . 
 
In the symmetric case, when the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e. when 
  21 , in equilibrium by symmetry, 
cccc  21 , (A4.2) becomes, 
 
0)()(' 

 cc cqcS
c
JU
                                        (A4.2a) 
 
Also, in the symmetric case, when     (A4.2a) becomes the same as (A3.2), therefore 
      . 
 
Now consider 121  . The FOC in the cooperative scenario becomes 
 0)(')()(')( 1  
c
i
c
i
c
i
c
i
i cqcccScq . By symmetry 
ccc ccc  12 that is the solution to the 
FOC that simplifies to  0)(')(  
c
i
c
i cScq  . Comparing the latter with the (A3.5) it follows 
that *ccc
nxc  . 
Consider now 021  .  Since 
ccc ccc  12 the FOCs in the cooperative scenario (A4.3a) 
and (A4.3b) become  0)(' ccS . Comparing the latter with (A3.5) since   ( )    it 
follows that *ccc
nxc  . 
 
Comparing the cooperative solution with the with the first best solution for the symmetric 
case, analysing the first best  FOC 0)(')( 


ii
i
i cSpq
c
W
 we have that:
 
)()()(')('0)(')()(')( **** cci
cc
i cqpqcScScScqcSpq  as in the first best 
the price is below the marginal cost    then 0)(')('0)()( **  ci
c cScScqpq . As 
*0(.)'' ccS c  . 
 
For the symmetric case        , proceeding with some comparative static analysis, 
consider the FOC (A4.2) by the implicit function theorem 
c
cc
cJU
cJU
d
dc
22
2
/
/





. 
Differentiating (A4.2) for 
cc  and   we find that )(/2 cqcJU c    and 
 
)(')(''/ 22 cqcScJU c  . Given that by the second order conditions the latter is negative 
then it follows that 
 
0
)(')("
)(
/ 



cqcS
cq
ddcc

                                                (A4.5) 
i.e., the higher is the providers' altruism level the lower is the collusive cost. 
 
Utility Payoffs 
 
Substituting the optimal cost strategies on the utility function the utility payoff earned by 
provider i under collusion is given by, 
 





c
ic
i
c
i
c
i
c
i
c
i
c
i dxxqcScqccU )()()()(                               (A4.6) 
 
In the symmetric case for homogeneous providers i.e.        , the utility payoff is 
given by,  



cc
cc dxxqcSU )()(                                              (A4.7) 
  
A5 Defection Scenario 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The defecting provider i will revert to behaving accordingly to the best response function as 
in (A3.2)  
0)(')(   i
c
i cScq                                         (A5.1) 
 
In the non-cooperative scenario we know that 
)()()(')('0)(')( ci
ncd
i
ncncnc cqcqcScScScq  . With ncci cc   and 0(.)' q  then 
0)(')('0)()(  di
ncc
i
nc cScScqcq . As di
nc ccS  0(.)'' .   
 
Consider now,
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Given 0)(' icq , it follows that 0)()( 12 
cc cqcq , then it must be 0)(')(' 21 
dd cScS . As 
0(.)'' S it follows that dd cc 12   must hold true. 
 
Consider equation (A5.1) evaluated at cic  and 
c
ic and compare it with the FOC in collusion 
(A4.2). For i = 1, the last two terms in (A4.2) are positive, thus it must be 
0)(')(  
c
i
c
i cScq  for the FOC to be satisfied. It follows that the cost chosen in defection 
is less than the cooperation cost. Thus the defection cost falls within, 
cdnc ccc 111  . 
 
With regards to provider 2, rewrite FOC (A3.8) as: 
           
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As 12 cc   and   0.' q  then         0' 21121  cqcqcqcc . For 0/ 1  cJU  to be 
verified it must be that     0' 112  cScq . Analogously, as 
        0' 12212  cqcqcqcc . For 0/ 2  cJU  then     0' 221  cScq .  
As 12   then        11112 '0' cqcScScq  . Also as (.)'S  is decreasing for 
     11212 '' cqcScScc  . Therefore if     cdcc cccqcS 2212 0'  .  
 
It is now possible to rank all the costs under the yardstick regulation,   
   
    
    
     
     
    
    
    
  
 
 
Comparative Statics 
Recall from (A5.1) that the optimal costs must satisfy the FOCs: 
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We know from equation A.3.9 that     
        so Total differentiation leads to: 























































1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0










F
dc
c
F
dc
c
F
F
dc
c
F
dc
c
F
d
F
d
F
dc
c
F
dc
c
F
d
F
d
F
dc
c
F
dc
c
F
 
In matrix format: 
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Using Cramer’s rule we obtain: 
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Where: 
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We know from equation A.3.9 that     
       , therefore computing the partial derivatives 
in A1, A2 and J: 
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With J>0 the sign of  
ii cc   21 , will be determined by the sign of A1 and A2. 
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Therefore it follows that: 
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Utility payoffs 
The utility payoff provider i earns in defection is given by 




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c
ic
i
d
i
c
i
d
i
c
i
d
i dxxqcScqccU )()()()(                              (A5.3) 
When the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e.   ii , by symmetry the 
cooperative solution is such that ci
c
i
c ccc    and the defection cost 
d
i
d
i
d ccc    is the 
solution to 0)(')(  cScq c . If we evaluate this at ccc   and compare it with FOC 
(A4.2a), we obtain 0)(')(  cc cScq . As (.)'S is a decreasing function, therefore
 
cd cc  . 
Also 0*)(')(  cScq c , then *ccd  . 
 
The utility payoff both providers earn is given by: 



cc
dcdcd dxxqcScqccU )()()()(                                         (A5.4) 
 
  
A6 Payoff Utility Ranking 
 
Rank of utility payoffs under the different scenarios 
Symmetric altruism 
Suppose          the payoff functions at the optimum are: 
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Therefore it follows that:   
     
    
 . 
 
Now we consider the case in which         . We have shown before if      then 
  
    
   (see proof of Proposition 3) and at   
   there are no profitable deviations. Therefore 
it follows that: 
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Assymmetric altruism 
Case 1:      and      
 
The utility payoffs for these levels of altruism are: 
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Since   
     
    
  then  (  
 )    (  
  ) and (  
    
 ) (  
 )   , implying that   
     
 . 
 
Since   
     
    
  analysing (A6.6) and (A6.7) it follows that   
    
  . Therefore:  
     
  
  
  
 
Subtracting equation (A6.8) to (A6.9) we obtain: 
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Recall that   
     
     
    
    
 . The term  (  
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 )    is positive for 
        Furthermore since   
     
  (see proof of Proposition 3) the term ∫  ( )
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       is positive since the consumer surplus is bigger in the non-cooperative 
game. Finally, since   
     
  the term ( (   )   (  
 ))    is negative since the slackness 
is bigger in the cooperative than in the non-cooperative scenario. 
 
Therefore it follows that   
     
  if and only if: 
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A more general formulation of equation A6.11 for        is 
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                  (A6.11a) 
 
Therefore for firm   cooperation is profitable only if we assume that the benefit from slack is 
big enough to offset the financial loose and the decrease in consumer surplus that more 
altruistic firms have to bear in cooperation. So   
    
  , only if equation (A6.11)  holds, 
otherwise    
    
  .  
 
For the less altruistic firm, i.e. firm   condition (A6.11) is easier to hold since (  
  
  
 ) (  
 )>0. 
 
  
A7 Proof of propositions 5 and Corollary 3 
Let    denote the discount rate above which collusion is sustainable such that: 
      {      }  
With  
   
  
    
 
  
    
             
   
     
 
   
     
   
Consider firm  . In order to understand how the each firm collusive behaviour varies with the 
level of altruism we need to assess the      given      . Consider the payoff utilities: 
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Derivation with respect to   : 
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(A7.6) 
 
 
 
 
Consider for now the symmetric case         . As seen above the payoff utilities can be 
ranked as:   
     
    
  (see Graph 1). 
 
Now consider the case for which         , as we have shown before if        
  
  
   implying   
    
     
   
 
Therefore (A7.4), (A7.5) and (A7.6) cam be written as:  
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(A7.6a) 
 
Consider (A7.4a) and (A7.5a). We know that for     ,   
     
   also that      
  
    
  therefore it must hold that 
   
 
   
 
   
  
   
 eaning that   
  grows faster than   
 .  
Therefore since for         
    
    it follows that  
   
 
   
 
   
  
   
 (see Graph 1). 
If   
   increases faster than   
  the it follows that    increases with   , i.e. for firm   
cooperation becomes more difficult for higher altruism levels. 
 
  
Consider now the impact of        on    . Consider the payoff utilities for firm     
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Derivation with respect to   : 
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It is straightforward to see that 
    
 
   
 
    
  
   
, i.e. when the opponent’s altruism increases the 
firm cooperation utility payoff also increases.  Since 
    
  
   
   it follows that     decreases 
with the opponent’s altruism level. 
 
Summarizing, we have shown that       leads to a decrease in     and an increase in   . 
Since: 
 
      {      }  
 
We need to assess    {      }.  If         we know that       . Departing from the 
symmetric case, consider a positive increase in firm’s   altruism level, i.e.    . As shown 
above this will increase    and decrease   , implying that      .  
 
Still, departing from the symmetric case, consider a decrease in firm’s   altruism level, i.e. 
     . As shown above this will increase    and decrease   , implying that      . 
 
Therefore we conclude that       implying that  
 |       
 |        for      
  and 
  |       
 |
     
   for      
 . 
Note that departing from a symmetric case an increase in    and a decrease in    are not 
feasible since in our model      . 
 
 
  
B  Figures 
 
Figure 1- Homogeneous Providers 
 
Figure 2- Asymmetric Providers 
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